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This paper provides a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity of the multiple-input multiple output (MIMO) Gaussian
wiretap channel, under a power-covariance constraint. Furthermore, the paper specifies the input covariance matrix required in
order to attain the capacity. The proof uses the fundamental relationship between information theory and estimation theory in
the Gaussian channel, relating the derivative of the mutual information to the minimum mean-square error (MMSE). The proof
provides the missing intuition regarding the existence and construction of an enhanced degraded channel that does not increase the
secrecy capacity. The concept of enhancement has been used in a previous proof of the problem. Furthermore, the proof presents
methods that can be used in proving other MIMO problems, using this fundamental relationship.
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1. Introduction
The information theoretic characterization of secrecy in
communication systems has attracted considerable attention
in recent years. (See [1] for an exposition of progress in this
area.) In this paper, we consider the general multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel, presented in [2],
with t transmit antennas and r and e receive antennas at the
legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper, respectively:
Yr[m] = HrX[m] + Wr[m],
Ye[m] = HeX[m] + We[m],
(1)
where Hr ∈ Rr×t and He ∈ Re×t are assumed to be fixed
during the entire transmission and are known to all three
terminals. The additive noise terms Wr[m] and We[m] are
zero-mean Gaussian vector processes independent across the






‖X[m]‖2 ≤ P. (2)
The secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel, defined by Wyner
[3], as “perfect secrecy” capacity is themaximal rate such that
the information can be decoded arbitrarily reliably by the
legitimate recipient, while insuring that it cannot be deduced
at any positive rate by the eavesdropper.
For a discrete memoryless wiretap channel with transi-
tion probability P(Yr ,Ye | X), a single-letter expression for
the secrecy capacity was obtained by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4]:
Cs = max
P(U ,X)
{I(U ;Yr)− I(U ;Ye)}, (3)
where U is an auxiliary random variable over a certain
alphabet that satisfies the Markov relationship U − X −
(Yr ,Ye). This result extends to continuous alphabet cases
with power constraint (2). Thus, in order to evaluate the
secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel we
need to evaluate (3) under the power constraint (2). For the
degraded case Wyner’s single-letter expression of the secrecy




The problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity of
the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel remained open until
the work of Khisti and Wornell [5] and Oggier and Hassibi
[6]. In their respective work, Khisti and Wornell [5] and
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Oggier and Hassibi [6] followed an indirect approach using
a Sato-like argument and matrix analysis tools. In [2] Liu
and Shamai propose a more information-theoretic approach
using the enhancement concept, originally presented by
Weingarten et al. [7], as a tool for the characterization of
the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel capacity. Liu and
Shamai have shown that an enhanced degraded version
attains the same secrecy capacity as does the Gaussian input
distribution. From the mathematical solution in [2] it is
evident that such an enhanced channel exists; however it is
not intuitive why, or how to construct such a channel.
A fundamental relationship between estimation theory
and information theory for Gaussian channels was presented
in [8]; in particular, it was shown that for the MIMO
standard Gaussian channel,
Y = √snrHX + N (5)
and regardless of the input distribution, the mutual infor-
mation and the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) are
















where E{X | Y} stands for the conditional mean of X given
Y . This fundamental relationship and its generalizations
[8, 9], referred to as the I-MMSE relations, have already been
shown to be useful in several aspects of information theory:
providing insightful proofs for entropy power inequalities
[10], revealing the mercury/waterfilling optimal power allo-
cation over a set of parallel Gaussian channels [11], tackling
the weighted sum-MSE maximization in MIMO broadcast
channels [12], illuminating extrinsic information of good
codes [13], and enabling a simple proof of the monotonicity
of the non-Gaussianness of independent random variables
[14]. Furthermore, in [15] it has been shown that using this
relationship one can provide insightful and simple proofs
for multiuser single antenna problems such as the broadcast
channel and the secrecy capacity problem. Similar techniques
were later used in [16] to provide the capacity region for the
Gaussian multireceiver wiretap channel.
Motivated by these successes, this paper provides an
alternative proof for the secrecy capacity of the MIMOGaus-
sian wiretap channel using the fundamental relationship
presented in [8, 9], which results in a closed-form expression
for the secrecy capacity, that is, an expression that does not
include optimization over the input covariance matrix, a
diﬃcult problem on its own due to the nonconvexity of
the expression [5]. Thus, another important contribution
of this paper is the explicit characterization of the optimal
input covariance matrix that attains the secrecy capacity. The
proof presented here provides the intuition regarding the
existence and construction of the enhanced degraded channel
which is central in the approach of [2]. Furthermore, the
methods presented here could be used to tackle other MIMO
problems, using the fundamental relationships shown in
[8, 9].
2. Definitions and Preliminaries
Consider a canonical version of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel, as presented in [2]:
Yr[m] = X[m] + Wr[m],
Ye[m] = X[m] + We[m],
(7)
where X[m] is a real input vector of length t, and Wr[m] and
We[m] are additive Gaussian noise vectors with zero means
and covariance matrices Kr and Ke, respectively, and are
independent across the time index m. The noise covariance
matrices Kr and Ke are assumed to be positive definite. The









where S is a positive semidefinite matrix of size t × t, and
“” denotes “less or equal to” in the positive semidefinite
partial ordering between real symmetric matrices. Note that
(8) is a rather general constraint that subsumes constraints
that can be described by a compact set of input covariance
matrices [7]. For example, assuming Cs(S) is the secrecy
capacity under a covariance constraint (8) we have according








where Cs(P) is the secrecy capacity under a total power
constraint (2), and Cs(P1,P2, . . . ,Pt) is the secrecy capacity
under a per antenna power constraint. As shown in [2, 7],
characterizing the secrecy capacity of the general MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel (1) can be reduced to character-
izing the secrecy capacity of the canonical version (7). For
full details the reader is referred to [7], and [17, Theorem 3].
We first give a few central definitions and relationships




(X− E{X | Y})(X− E{X | Y})T
}
, (10)
that is, E is the covariance matrix of the estimation error
vector, known as the MMSE matrix. For the specific case in
which the input to the channel is Gaussian with covariance
matrix Kx, we define
EG = Kx −Kx(Kx + K)−1Kx, (11)
where K is the covariance matrix of the additive Gaussian
noise, N. That is, EG is the error covariance matrix of the
joint Gaussian estimator.
The fundamental relationship between information the-
ory and estimation theory in the Gaussian channel gave rise
to a variety of other relationships [8, 9]. In our proof, we will
use the following relationship, given by Palomar and Verdu´
in [9]:
∇KI(X;X + N) = −K−1EK−1, (12)
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where K is the covariance matrix of the additive Gaussian
noise, N.
Our first observation regarding the relationship given in
(12) is detailed in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any two symmetric positive semidefinite matri-
ces K1 and K2, such that 0  K1  K2 and positive semidefinite
matrix A, the integral
∫
K1K2K
−1A(K)K−1 dK is nonnegative
(where K1  K2 is any path from K1 to K2).
The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix A.
3. The Degraded MIMO Gaussian
Wiretap Channel
We first consider the degraded MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel, that is, Kr  Ke.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity of the degraded MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel (7), Kr  Ke, under the power-
covariance constraint (8) is










Proof. Using (12) the diﬀerence to be maximized, according





This is due to the independence of the line integral (A.3) on
the path in any open connected set in which the gradient is
continuous [18].
The error covariance matrix of any optimal estimator is
upper bounded (in the positive semidefinite partial ordering
between real symmetric matrices) by the error covariance
matrix of the joint Gaussian estimator, EG, defined in (11),
for the same input covariance. Formally, E  EG, and thus
one can express E as follows: E = EG − E0, where E0 is some
positive semidefinite matrix.
Due to this representation of E we can express the























where the last inequality is due to Lemma 1 and the fact that
Kr  Ke. Equality in (15) is attained when X is Gaussian.





















































































4. The General MIMO Gaussian
Wiretap Channel
In considering the general case, we first note that one can
apply the generalized eigenvalue decomposition [19] to the
following two symmetric positive definite matrices:
I + S1/2K−1r S
1/2, I + S1/2K−1e S
1/2. (17)










I + S1/2K−1r S
1/2
]
C = Λr ,
(18)
where Λr = diag{λ1,r , λ2,r , . . . , λt,r} is a positive definite
diagonal matrix. Without loss of generality, we assume that
there are b (0 ≤ b ≤ t) elements of Λr larger than 1:
λ1, r ≥ . . . ≥ λb, r > 1 ≥ λb+1, r ≥ · · · λt, r . (19)
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where Λ1 = diag{λ1, r , . . . , λb, r}, and Λ2 =
diag{λb+1, r , . . . , λt, r}. Since the matrix I + S1/2K−1e S1/2 is
positive definite, the problem of calculating the generalized
eigenvalues and the matrix C is reduced to a standard
eigenvalue problem [19]. Choosing the eigenvectors of the
standard eigenvalue problem to be orthonormal, and the
requirement on the order of the eigenvalues, leads to an
invertible matrix C, which is I + S1/2K−1e S1/2-orthonormal.
Using these definitions we turn to the main theorem of this
paper.
Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel (7), under the power-covariance constraint
(8), is








































and letting C = [C1C2] where C1 is the t × b submatrix and











Proof. Following [7, Lemma 2], we may assume that S is
(strictly) positive definite. We divide the proof into two parts:
the converse part, that is, constructing an upper bound,
and the achievability part-showing that the upper bound is
attainable.
(a) Converse. Our goal is to evaluate the secrecy capacity
expression (3). Due to the Markov relationship, U − X −
(Yr ,Ye), the diﬀerence to be maximized can be written as
I(U ;Yr)− I(U ;Ye)
= {I(X;Yr)− I(X;Ye)} − {I(X;Yr | U)− I(X;Ye | U)}.
(24)






where E = E{(X− E[X | Y])(X− E[X | Y])T}, and
I(X;Yr | U)− I(X;Ye | U)




K−1E[(X− E[X | Y,U = u])









where Eu = E{(X − E[X | Y,U])(X− E[X | Y,U])T}. Thus,
putting the two together, (24) becomes
I(U ;Yr)− I(U ;Ye) =
∫
KrKe
K−1(E− Eu)K−1 dK. (27)
We define, E˜ = E− Eu, and obtain
E˜ = E
{




(E[E[X | Y,U] | Y]− E[X | Y,U])




That is, E˜ is the error covariance of the optimal estimation of
E[X | Y,U] from Y, and as such it is positive semidefinite. It
is easily verified that K0, defined in (22), satisfies both K0 
Ke, and K0  Kr . The integral in (27) can be upper bounded
using this fact and Lemma 1:













Equality will be attained when the second integral equals
zero. Using the upper bound in (29) we present two possible
proofs that result with the upper bound given in (30). The
more information-theoretic proof is given in the sequel,
while the second, the more estimation-theoretic proof, is
relegated to Appendix B.
The upper bound given in (29) can be viewed as the
secrecy capacity of an MIMO Gaussian model, similar to
the model given in (7), but with noise covariance matrices
K0 and Ke and outputs Y0[m] and Ye[m], respectively.
Furthermore, this is a degraded model, and it is well known
that the general solution given by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4],
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reduces to the solution given by Wyner [3] by setting U ≡ X.
Thus, (29) becomes
I(U ;Yr)− I(U ;Ye)



































where the third inequality is according to (15), and the last
two transitions are due to Theorem 1, (16). This completes
the converse part of the proof.
(b) Achievability. We now show that the upper bound given
in (30) is attainable when X is Gaussian with covariance
matrix K∗x , as defined in (23). The proof is constructed
from the next three lemmas. We first prove that K∗x is a
legitimate covariance matrix, that is, it complies with the
input covariance constraint (8).
Lemma 2. The matrix K∗x defined in (23) complies with the
power-covariance constraint (8), that is,
0  K∗x  S. (31)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix C. In the next
two Lemmas we show that K∗x attains the upper bound given
in (30).






















I + K∗x K−1e
) . (32)
Proof of Lemma 3. We first calculate the expression in the left
hand side (assuming S 








I + S1/2K−1e S1/2
) = det C












where we have used the generalized eigenvalue decomposi-













Using (34) we can derive the following relationship (full
details are given in Appendix D):
det
(








And similarly we can derive
det
(

















I + K∗x K−1e
) = det(Λ1), (37)
which is the result attained in (33). This concludes the proof
of Lemma 3.






















I + K∗x K−1e
) . (38)
Proof of Lemma 4. Due to the generalized eigenvalue decom-
























Thus, concluding the proof of Lemma 4.














































where the first equality is due to Lemma 3, and the second
equality is due to Lemma 4. Thus, the upper bound given
in (30) is attainable using the Gaussian distribution over X,
U ≡ X, and K∗x , defined in (23). This concludes the proof of
Theorem 2.
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5. Discussion and Remarks
The alternative proof we have presented here uses the
enhancement concept, also used in the proof of Liu and
Shamai [2], in a more concrete manner. We have constructed
a specific enhanced degraded model. The constructed model
is the “tightest” enhancement possible in the sense that under
the specified transformation, thematrix CT[I+S1/2K−10 S1/2]C
is the “smallest” possible positive definitematrix, that is, both
 Λr and  I.
The specific enhancement results in a closed-form
expression for the secrecy capacity, using K0. Furthermore,
Theorem 2 shows that instead of S we can maximize the
secrecy capacity by taking an input covariance matrix that
“disregards” subchannels for which the eavesdropper has
an advantage over the legitimate recipient (or is equivalent
to the legitimate recipient). Mathematically, this allows us
to switch back from K0 to Kr , and thus to show that K∗x ,
explicitly defined, is the optimal input covariance matrix.
Intuitively, K∗x is the optimal input covariance for the
legitimate receiver, since under the transformation, C, it is
S for the sub-channels for which the legitimate receiver has
an advantage and zero otherwise.
The enhancement concept was used in addition to the
I-MMSE approach in order to attain the upper bound in
(30). The primary usage of these two concepts came together
in (29), where we derived an initial upper bound. We have
shown that the upper bound is attainable when X is Gaussian
with covariance matrix K∗x . Thus, under these conditions the
























where the second transition is due to the choice U ≡ X, the
third is due to the choice of a Gaussian distribution for X
with covariance matrix K∗x , and the last equality is due to
Lemma 4.
Appendices
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The inner product between matrices A and B is defined as
A · B = vecATvecB, (A.1)
and the Schur product between matrices A and B is defined
as
[A B]i j = [A]i j[B]i j . (A.2)
For a function G with gradient∇G the line integral (type II)







∇G(−→r 1 + u
(−→r 2 −−→r 1




Thus in our case, where ∇G, −→r are t × t matrices, and
∇G = K−1A(K)K−1 the integral over a path from K1 to K2 is
equivalent to the following line integral:
∫ 1
u=0
(K1 + u(K2 −K1))−1A(K1 + u(K2 −K1))




1T(K1 + u(K2 −K1))−1A(K1 + u(K2 −K1))
× (K1 + u(K2 −K1))−1  (K2 −K1)1du.
(A.4)
Since the Schur product preserves the positive defi-
nite/semidefinite quality [20, 7.5.3], it is easy to see that when
0  K1  K2, both are symmetric, and since A(K) is a
positive semidefinite matrix for all K, the integral is always
nonnegative.
B. Second Proof of Theorem 2
The error covariance matrix of the optimal estimator E˜ can
be written as E˜ = E˜L − E0, where both E˜L and E0 are positive
semidefinite, and E˜L is the error covariance matrix of the
optimal linear estimator of E[X | Y,U] from Y. Using this
in (29), we have

























where the last inequality is again due to Lemma 1. Equality
will be attained when E˜L = E˜, that is, when E0 = 0.
We denote Z = E[X | Y,U]. The optimal linear estimator
has the following form:
E˜L = Cz − CzyCy−1Cyz, (B.2)
where Cz is the covariance matrix of Z, Czy and Cyz are
the cross-covariance matrices of Z and Y, and Cy is the
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= Cxy = Kx
Cy = (Kx + K).
(B.3)
Regarding Cz we can claim the following:
0  E
{
(X− E[X | Y,U])(X− E[X | Y,U])T
}
= Kx − E
{





E[X | Y,U]E[X | Y,U]T
}
= Cz  Kx, (B.5)
where equality, Cz = Kx, is attained when the estimation
error is zero, that is, when X = E[X | Y,U]. Since Y =
X + N this can only be achieved when U ≡ X or U ≡ N;
however since the Markov property, U − X − (Ye,Yr), must
be preserved, we conclude that U ≡ X in order to achieve
equality.
We have Kx−C0 = Cz, where C0 is a positive semidefinite
matrix, and the linear estimator is
E˜L = Kx − C0 −Kx(Kx + K)−1Kx. (B.6)
Substituting this into the integral in (B.1) we have





































where the second inequality is due to Lemma 1, and the last
inequality is due to Theorem 1, (16). The resulting upper
bound equals the one given in (30). The rest of the proof
follows via similar steps to those in the proof given in
Section 4.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Since the sub-matrix CT1 C1 is positive semidefinite it is
evident that 0  K∗x . Thus, it remains to show that K∗x  S.


































I + ICT1 C2M−1C
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where I denotes (CT1 C1)
−1
and






due to the positive definite quality of CTC and the Schur
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D. Deriving Equation (35)
det
(


















































































































= det I det(Λ1).
(D.1)
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